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IS THE "INVISIBLE HAND" BIASED? 
Metropolitan Fragmentation and Individual Choice 
by Gary J Miller* 
"Every change in the scope of conflict has a bias; it 
is partisan in nature." · 
E. E. Schattschneider (1960:4) 
Because of its alleged disruption of efficient 
government, urban reformers have traditionally regarded metro-
politan fragmentation as a major evil. The multiple, often 
small-sized urban governments found in most of our metropolitan 
areas are unable (it is charged) to realize economies of scale, 
to employ professional staffs, to engage in long-range planning, 
in short to deal effectively with the problems associated with 
the urban crisis. In addition, fragmentation is said to promote 
allocative inefficiency by inadequate handling of externalities. 
Municipalities may act as "free riders" by living off the positive 
externalities provided by their neighbors, or they may impose 
negative externalities on their neighbors in the form of air, 
water, or noise pollution. Both kinds of externality will result 
*I would like to thank Joe Oppenheimer for his unstinting 
advice and criticism during early analysis of this problem. 
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in allocative inefficiency. The remedy for both transformational 
ineffic:l.ency and allocative inefficiency is the same, according 
to the traditional urban reform movement: construct "large" 
enough metropolitan governments to exploit economies of scale 
and to eliminate externalities.1 
In a truly significant article, economist Charles 
Tiebout (1956:416-424) developed a theoretical groundwork 
for an entirely different set of policy recommendations. 
Tiebout's article intended to show that fragmentation could 
serve a beneficial purpose by providing a choice of municipalities 
(each with its own mix of municipal goods and services) of 
residents of a metropolitan area. Assuming that individuals 
have different preferences for mixes of municipal goods and 
services, the existence of choice offers the opportunity for 
"voting with one's feet" to get a public goods mix as close as 
possible to one's most preferred mix. By this revelation of 
preferences, a more efficient allocation of resources for public 
goods can be achieved. 
This article was perhaps the first in what has been 
called the "public choice approach" to urban reform (Bish and 
Ostrom, 1973:17-34). This approach views large-scale metropolitan 
government as likely to be too cumbersome and bureaucratic to 
be efficient. "A public economy composed of multiple jurisdic-
tions. is likely to be more efficient and responsive than a public 
economy organized as a single area-wide monopoly . " (Bish and 
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Ostrom, 1973: 2. ) Small-scale governments can obtain the advantages 
of economies of scale by contracting with large-scale producers, 
without sacrificing responsiveness (Ostrom et al. , 1961:831-842,) 
In fact, with certain conditions, it is always more efficient 
to provide a public good with smaller rather than a single, 
consolidated jurisdiction (Oates, 1972 :35.) To deal with exter­
nalities, a complex, overlapping system of multiple jurisdictions 
is advocated, so that the boundaries of the population affected 
by a public good will coincide as nearly as possible to the 
boundaries of the jurisdiction providing the good (Olson, 1969: 
479-487.) 
The public choice approach has provided a valuable 
alternative paradigm for urban reformers. It has demonstrated 
the usefulness of economic assumptions and means of analysis 
to the study of urban problems, and it has marshalled sufficient 
empirical evidence to demonstrate convincingly that many of the 
assumptions of the traditional, consolidationist urban reformers 
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are simply unwarranted. However, I am concerned that, in the 
present early stage of development of the public choice approach, 
a premature policy committal to the cause of fragmentation not 
be made. 
As an example, public choice theorists often leave the 
impression that, while consolidation is necessarily harmful to 
the interests of many people , increased fragmentation could do 
nothing but help. Tiebout says (1956:,423-424): 
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those who argue for a m�tropolitan police force instead 
of local police cannot prove their case· on purely economic 
grounds. If �ne of the communities were to receive less 
police protection after integration than it received before, 
integration could be objected to as a violation of consumers' 
choice • • • •  [On the other hand] Policies that promote residen­
tial mobility and increase the knowledge of the consumer­
voter will improve the allocation of governmental expendi­
tures in the same sense that mobility among jobs and knowledge 
relevant to the location of industry and labor improve the 
allocation of private resources. 
While consolidation will mean that at least some subset of the 
population will be forced to consume a public goods package that 
is farther from its preferences, increased fragmentation 
necessarily means that some individuals will be able to move to 
a location that more nearly satisfies their preferences. "The 
greater the number of communities and the greater variance among 
them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his 
preference position. " (Tiebout, 1956:418. ) The implication seems 
to be that greater choice can hurt no one, but decreased choice 
must necessarily hurt someone. Municipal incorporation of 
small, homogeneous groups of individuals should be encouraged, 
because they are able to provide themselves with a public good 
package that suits themselves, at no harm to anyone else. As 
Bish describes the process (1971:137), "Families with similar 
tastes locate together, and often, incorporate as a municipality 
to preserve their selective residential environment." 
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It is interesting to note that this public choice 
defense of fragmentation, like the traditional reformist critique, 
is primarily based on the notion of allocative efficiency. 
Reading the advocates of one position or another, one gets the 
feeling that, if only the most efficient governmental organization 
could be achieved, a great "efficiency dividend" could be 
realized, much like the "efficiency dividend" that politicians 
suppose could be realized by "reorganization of the federal 
bureaucracy"" On achieving just the right organizational formula, 
whether of greater or lesser fragmentation, everyone could be 
better off (at least with the right distribution of the dividend.) 
Despite the fact that "efficiency" has dominated the' 
discussion of metropolitan government (Greer, 1963:12), it is the 
position of this paper that efficiency is fundamentally irrelevant 
to an analysis of the politics of metropolitan organization. This 
is the case because institutional arrangements are so closely 
tied to the distribution of resources that a change in institutional 
arrangements inevitably has a redistributional (and thus political) 
bias. While the "ideal" an:angement of local governments may 
include a system of fragmented neighborhood governments, in the 
immediate reality of American government, a move to either consoli­
date or de-centralize metropolitan government could never be a 
universally beneficial move. There is no efficiency dividend. 
For this reason, efficiency arguments for and against fragmentation 
are pointless, and obscure the relevant political question : who 
shall and should be helped, and who hurt, by changes in urban 
institutions? Who should get more and who less? 
1. "Preference Position" and "Conformity Cost " 
One assumption common to Tiebout and other public 
choice defenders of fragmentation is that individuals have 
markedly different tastes for public goods, and that these 
tastes motivate mobility from one jurisdiction to another, 
or even the creation of new jurisdictions. For instance, 
Tiebout says (1956:418): 
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The consumer-voter moves to that community whose local 
government best satisfies his set of preferences. The 
greater the number of communities and the greater variance 
among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully 
realizing his preference position. [emphasis added] 
This use of the expression "preference position" seems to suggest 
that an individual has some ideal set of preferences for muni­
cipal goods, which does not change as he moves from community 
to community. Similarly, Bish states (1971:137) that "Families 
with 'similar tastes' locate together • . .  " Oates discusses a 
concept called "conformity costs", which is a cost imposed on an 
individual that increases with the difference between his own 
preference position for public goods, and the particular package 
of public goods available in a given jurisdiction. Total 
"conformity costs" are seen to be necessarily smaller in small, 
homogeneous jurisdictions than in a single, heterogeneous juris­
diction, because at least some individuals will be closer to their 
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ideal "preference position". Tiebout's theory is thus about 
individuals minimizing "conformity costs" by locating in appro- · 
priate jurisdictions. "Conformity costs" is, of course, only a 
meaningful concept if there is something like a "preference 
position" that is unchanging in various jurisdictions; a preference 
position that changes as an individual crosses jurisdictional 
boundaries would not allow meaningful comparisons of costs 
incurred in different jurisdictions. 
In all of these instances, I believe, the public choice 
theorists miss a fundamental and crucial point: the politically 
relevant phenomenon is not some immutable "preference position" 
based on an intrinsic set of "tastes" for public goods, but the 
quantity of a public good demanded by an individual in a given 
jurisdiction. And the quantity demanded of a public good is 
clearly a function or the opportunities and costs in a given 
jurisdiction. By clearly focussing on the factors that make the 
quantity demanded different in different jurisdictions, we can 
question whether inter-jurisdictional mobility is simply a 
benign process by which people with similar tastes find each 
other, like a giant romantic comedy with a happy ending. 
To consider the easiest case, let us assume that an 
individual's income (yi) is spent
 on his purchase of a private, 
excludable good (z1) and on a tax for a
 municipally provided, 
non-excludable good such as police service. This good is 
measured as number of units of municipal output or activity (such 
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as patrol units) per capita, and is denoted by q3• The cost 
of providing the activity is of course, r R3, where RJ is the 
number of units of the output provided by the municipal govern-
ment, and r is the price per unit output, which is assumed to 
be invariant throughout the metropolitan area. Thus, for 
instance, the 1977 cost of contracting for a basic general 
p atrol unit from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office is 
$364,929, for those municipalities who contract with the county 
for this service.3 The cost of providing QJ per capita units 
of police protection is rQJNJ. The cost to an individual in the 
jurisdiction is tirQJNJ, where ti is the share of the cost he 
pays in taxes. 
If the tax is not regressiv e or progressive, and :!.f 
the budget is balanced, every individual will have a tax share 
equal to 
ti 
Yi 
E Yi iE:J 
The budget constraint (assuming unitary price for the private 
good Z) is 
Yi= zi + tirQJNJ
. 
The budget constraints for individuals i and j, with incomes yi 
and y., are shown in Figure 1. The z.-intercept is shown to be 
J 1 
a linear function of income, but as can be seen, theQ3-intercept 
is not a function of the individual's wealth with a progressive 
taxation system. The q3-intercept is a function of per capita 
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wealth and the price of the municipal service. As this demonstrates, 
the slopes of the budget constraints must vary with income, which 
is of course not the case with budget constraints for strictly 
private good markets. Furthermore, an increase in per capita 
wealth in the jurisdiction acts as a price decrease, by flattening 
the slope of the budget constraint. 
[Figure 1 goes here] 
In the case of a proportional tax system, then, there 
is a difference in the slopes of budget constraints for individuals 
with different incomes. Regressivity tends to widen the difference 
in slopes. For instance, assume more generally that 
a. 
ti 
Yi 
E (ya.) 
iEJ i 
If a. is greater than one, the tax will be progressive, and if it 
is less than one, the tax will be regressive. In Figure 2, budget 
constraints are shown for three individuals with 50 percent, 32 
percent and 18 percent of the jurisdiction's wealth, respectively, 
The solid lines show the budget constraints under a progressive 
tax system, the dashed lines for a regressive tax system. The 
change from a proportional to regressive tax system (with a. = 1/2) 
serves as a price decrease f or the richer individuals, and a price 
increase for the other two, thus increasing the difference in 
slopes. 
[Figure 2 goes here] 
zj 
Figure 1. 
Budget Constra�nts for Individuals with Incomes yi and yj' 
Assuming Proportional Taxation and Balanced Budget 
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Figure 2. 
Budget Constraints for Three Different Individuals with 
Proportional·and Regressive Tax Sharing Systems. 
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Furthermore, the income elasticity of demand will be 
different with different tax shares, For instance, with a 
a B utility function of the form ui = ziQJ, the demand function for 
the publically provided crowdable good is: 
Yi B ---
Q = B+y tirNJ 
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With a straight head tax, this demand function results in unitaJ:Y 
income elasticity. With a proportional tax share, the good 
becomes a neutral good. With a progressive tax share, the good 
becomes an inferior public good, and with a regressive tax share, 
the same demand function represents a normal good. 
The fact the the quantity demanded of the public good 
varies with tax shares and with the wealth of the juris'diction, 
has several important implications for the public choice defense 
of fragmentation. First, income will be a highly significant 
factor determining articulated "preferences" for public goods; 
this means that the clustering of individuals with similar 
"tastes" for public good will result in a tendency towards 
segregation by income. Second, the quantity of a public good 
demanded by an individual is also dependent on the tax share he 
must pay in a particular jurisdiction with a particular populatio�. 
Thus, the concept of "conformity costs", in as much as it is 
dependent on the idea of a static "preference position" for 
individuals, is unworkable. The quantity demanded by an individual 
may shift as he moves to a new jurisdiction, or if he simply stays 
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in a single jurisdiction in which other people are moving in 
and out. 
Furthermore, an individual may be better off in a large, 
consolidated jurisdiction in which his quantity demanded is diff-
erent from that which he is receiving, than he would be in a 
smaller, homogeneous jurisdic tion where he is getting exactly 
the quantity he demands. And conversely, a poor individual may 
be worse off in a fragmented metropolitan jurisdiction, where the 
jurisdiction is completely responsive to his articulated demands, 
than he would be in a consolidated metropolis that is unresponsive. 
A single, simplified, but not totally unrealistic 
example may serve to illustrate all of the points made above. 
Let us assume a population of individuals is divided into three 
equally sized income classes. We assume there are ten individuals 
in each income class, and that individuals in the highest income 
class have income Y. The individuals in the middle income class 
all have income .64(Y), and those in the lowest income class all 
have income .36(Y). There are two goods, one a private good, and 
one a crowdable, but non-excludable publically provided good. 
All individuals have identical utility functions of the form 
1/2 1/2 . Ui = Zi Q , The price
 of Z is assumed to be unity. The 
taxing system is regressive, with the tax share for the ith 
individual being given by ti = ./.yi 
r..ry:­i 
These assumptions 
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result in the demand functions given in the table on the 
following page. Since there is but one public good, the median 
voter's preference is the Condorcet winner, and that is assumed 
to be the quantity of the public good actually provided. This 
results in the tax totals and utilities given in the rest of the 
tables in terms of Y and r. 
[Tables 1 and 2 go here] 
Now we assume that two other jurisdictions are set 
up on the outskirts of the central jurisdiction, but within 
easy commuting distance of the original city, so that commuting 
costs are neglected. Individuals are faced with a choice of 
jurisdictions. This situation exactly fits that described by 
Tiebout, since there are an adequate number of municipalities 
now to satisfy the range of demands of the total population, 
and since there are no mobility costs. We would predict, with 
Tiebout, that the residential equilibrium would result in per-
feet stratification of the population, with each municipality 
serving each income class perfectly, and with no "conformity 
costs". But as can be seen by Table II, this does not mean 
that everyone is better off in the fragmented metropolitan 
area. On the contrary, the lower class is worse off, by a 
rather drastic amount • 
The reason for this is. that, even though the consoli-
dated metropolitan government had a regressive taxation system, 
the presence of the wealthy 'individuals was a "positive externality" 
for the lower income classes, who benefitted from their resources . 
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Table 1 
Consolidated Metropolitan Gove-.:nment 
Lower Income Group Middle Income Group Upper lncome Group 
Size 10 
ui
l/2cf/2 zi J 
Yi (.36)Y 
ti .025 
Q demanded (.24)Y/r 
Q received (.32}Y/r 
Total Cost of 
QJ = (9.6)Y 
Tax Total for 
each individual (.24)Y 
zi (.12)Y 
u1 (.196)Y 
rl/2 
10 
l/2
Q
l/2 zi 
J 
(.64)Y 
.033 
(.32)Y/r 
(.32)Y/r 
(. 32)Y 
(. 32)Y 
(.32)Y 
1/2 
r 
10 
l/2Ql/2 zi 
J 
y 
.042 
(.42)Y/r 
(. 32)Y/r 
(.40)Y 
(.60)Y . 
(;438)Y 
1/2 
r 
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Table 2 
Three Fragmented Metropolitan Governments 
Lower Income Govt. Middle Income Govt. Upper Income Govt. 
Size 10 10 10 
ui 
l/2Ql/2zi i 
l/2Ql/2 zi i 
l/2Ql/2 zi i 
Yi (.36)Y (.M)Y y 
ti .100 .100 .100 
Q demanded and 
Q received (.18)Y/r (.32)Y/r (.50)Y/r 
Tax Total (.18)Y ( .32)Y (.50)Y 
zi (.18)Y (.32)Y (.50}Y 
ui (.18)Y (.32)Y (. 50)Y 
r 1/2 r 1/2 rl/2 
2. Metropolitan Organization and Institutional Bias 
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This suggests that alternative structures of governmental 
institutions in a metropolis have different biases. Metropolitan 
consolidation, other things being equal, has·a redistributive, 
pro-lower class bias. On the other hand, community choice is a 
bane to the lower income individuals. Once the choice of 
municipalities was made freely available to all the population, 
the fate of the lower class individuals was sealed. This example 
l 
has obvious implications for other metropolitan areas. 
For instance Bish (1971:84), in discussing the benefits 
of metropolitan fragmentation in Los Angeles cites the existence 
of variable demand for library services, which were not being me� 
by the county-wide library system. The fragmented metropolitan 
system allowed an improvement on this situation. 
Another group of municipalities to withdraw from the 
country library system was composed of citizens who had 
much higher demands for library services. Beverly Hills 
and San Marino withdrew and provided a higher level of 
service with higher budget allocations than either the 
county service or independent library districts of com­
parable size in the county. It is not clear whether the 
move resulted in increased tax rates because they had 
higher-than-average property valuations, and.library 
services at a higher level than the county offered could 
have been provided without raising tax rates. 
Obviously, .this improved the lot of the citizens of Beverly Hills 
and San Marino: they got better library services at the same cost 
to the individual. However, it also had a detrimental effect to 
those individuals left covered by the county-wide system. They 
would have been better off if it had been illegal to withdraw 
from the system. 
Returning to our example, if there had been a vote among 
the 30 citizens on the question of whether or not to allow the 
incorporation of the two neighboring cities, it should rationally 
have been defeated by a 2 to 1 margin. However, in real life, the 
legal system seems to take the position taken by the public choice 
theorists. 
Similarly, Bish notes (1971:137) the way in which the 
incorporation of new municipalities in Los Angeles County has 
allowed families "with similar tastes" to "incorporate as a 
municipality to preserve their selective residential environment. 
This has resulted in a situation in which (1971:102) "the indivi-
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dual.cities within Los Angeles County, with their homogeneous 
groupings of citizens, seem able to reflect demand quite efficiently.0 
As examples, he gives the case of Rolling Hills (1971:88): 
Incorporated in 19 57, this area is composed almost exclusively 
of one- to five-acre estates on the Palos Verdes Peninsula • • • 
The city is entirely residential; it is a single-purpose 
city; there is no industry, no manufacturing • • •  (The citizens 
want to keep it, and they are willing to pay for it. 
Here is no evidence of a small group of individuals clustering 
together because they have similar tastes for public goods. Instead, 
Rolling Hills seems to be a group of individuals who have similar 
resources to provide themselves with the good life, and are willing 
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to erect whatever institutional boundaries are necessary to 
protect it. 
Similarly, Bish points out the City of Industry (1971:89) 
whose boundaries were drawn to include �ommercial and 
industrial land. It records a per capita property value of 
$ 54,868 for its 638 inhabitants • . •  Industry was quite 
satisfied with county-level services, and since its incor­
poration, has found it unnecessary to levy a municipal 
property tax because sales tax revenues and other state 
funds have been sufficient to meet county contract payments, 
Here again, there is no evidence 'that the 638 inhabitants of 
Industry share anything besides a desire to maintain a per capita 
property value of $ 54,868. As Bish himself states (1971:89,), 
Their incorporation served to prevent the imposition of 
political externalities by neighboring municipalities that 
wanted to acquire their relatively high tax bases for financing 
of public goods and services for their own citizens. 
In fact, by fiscal year 1970-71, the population of Industry was 
virtually unchanged, and the property per capita figure had risen 
to $163, 000,
' 
which had yet to be taxed to provide mun:lcipal 
services. 
A brief examination of the history of new :1,ncorporations 
in Los Angeles County since World War II indicates that Rolling 
Hills and Industry were typical, rather than unique, in their 
motivation. Although none of the cities incorporated before that 
time have zero property tax rates, 22 of the 32 post-war cities 
had zero property tax rates in 1971, 
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Returning to our mythical 30-person metropolitan 
area, if there had been a vote among the total population on 
the question of whether or not to allow the incorporation of the 
two adjoining cities, it would probably have been defeated by a 
2 to 1 margin. However, in real life, the legal system seems 
to take the position taken by the public choice theorists, that 
the creation of a new municipality affects no one but those who 
live in it. In California, the Municipal Corporation Act operates 
under the principle, that "a municipal corporation is considered 
to be a voluntary creation, brought into being only at the 
request of local inhabitants • • •  " (Crouch and Dinerinan, 1964:81) . 
Although the county board of supervisors is responsible for over-
seeing the process of incorporation, their actions are stictly 
regulated by state law, except that they may choose to substract 
property from the prospective incorporation that was mentioned 
in the petition from local inhabitants that originated the incor-
poration procedur·e. The final step in incorporation is an 
election among the inhabitants of the proposed municipality. 
Individuals in neighboring municipalities have little or no say. 
An increased range of choice of communities thus can occur fairly 
easily and automatically, despite the potential effects this might 
have on other inhabitants of the metropolitan area. The relative 
ease with which increased fragmentation can take place, and the 
relative difficulty of increased consolidation, suggest an anti-
lower class bias in the legal structure provided for metropolitan 
institutions. 
3. Fragmentation, Pareto Optimality; and Choice 
One of the central controversies in the historical 
dia logue concerning the just society has been that between 
I 
free individual choice versus social and political authority, 
or what Wolff has called (1970:3-20) "the conflict between 
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authority and autonomy." Hobbes, making the argument for authority, 
has invoked a kind of Prisoners' Dilemma (1902:98-113); that is, 
individuals in a situation of completely free choice will remain 
in a sub-optimal state of nature. Some degree of authority is 
necessary it is argue , to restrict individual choice and thus to 
achieve a more efficient outcome. 
Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand" argument is one of the 
clearest defenses of individual autonomy (1952:182-300). He ina,kes· 
this case by arguing the coincidence of choice and efficiency. 
That is, in certain situations, individuals, acting of thei.r own 
free will and in their c·wn best interests, will achieve a 
collectively efficient outcome. 
In American society, at least, the "Invisible Hand" kind 
of argument has grounded an �ntense popular belief in individual 
choice as a value. It is often argued further that anything which 
extends the range of individual choices is also valuable. A 
wider range of goods and services in the market extends individual 
choice opportunities and is therefore good. The army promotes 
itself by advertising the wide range of jobs frODI which a recruit 
may choose. The Republican and Democratic parties· are condemned 
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when they seem to offer identical platforms, and so Goldwater 
offers a "choice, not an echo. " 
Economists, in particular, are found in support of the 
liberal pro-individual choice position more often than not, and 
they are strengthened in this position by the firm result in 
welfare economics that individual rational choice, in a free, 
competitive, private goods market, results in a Pareto optimal 
distribution of goods and services in that market. Restricting 
individual choice (for example, by denying certain alternatives 
for some buyers in the market) can only result in sub-optimality. 
Thus, welfare economics, it seems, has provided a 
"scientific reason" to come down in favor of human choice and the 
invisible hand, and in opposition to central direction and 
hierarchical authority. 
Public goods are viewed as problematic by economists 
precisely because they spoil this nice result. A Pareto-optimal 
distribution of public goods is one in which the sums of individual 
marginal benefits is equal to marginal cost. But a rational 
individual will choose to equate his own marginal benefit and 
marginal cost. We suddenly find ourselves in a Prisoners ' Dilenma, 
with individual choice implying sub-optimal equilibria. 
Escaping from the Prisoners' Dilennna of public good 
sub-optimality is almost as distateful as remaining in it, because 
escape, as a practical, political problem, seems to imply some 
diminution of individual freedODI of choice. We must rely on a 
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self-interested political organizer to set up political organization, 
who will limit our choice set by means of selective incentives, 
so that we will be forced to donate to the provision of a public 
good. Rather than the beauty and simplicity of the Invisible Hand, 
we are left with the sordid messiness of self-interested politicians, 
large scale· organizations, the Iron Law of Oligarchy, and all 
.simply to restrict our choice sets and provide the optimal 
level of public goods. Maybe we don't want those public goods 
after all? 
Tiebout's result was significant, from the standpoint 
of political philosophy, because it seemed to restore the 
coincidence of efficiency and individual choice in the troubleso�e 
area of public good provision. Tiebout wrote (19 56:416) "Seemingly, 
we are faced with the problem of having a rather large portion of 
our national income allocated in a 'non-optimal' way when compared 
with the private sector." However, he hoped to show that the 
problem of sub-optimal equilibria while "valid for federal 
expenditures, need not apply to local expenditures." That is, by 
maintaining and even increasing the range of individual choice 
over a dimension that had not yet entered economic analysis (the 
number of.municipalities supply local public goods) we could .again 
find that the Invisible Hand led to an optimal solution. 
While Tiebout's analysis does demonstrate that the 
fragmented metropolitan institutional form can indeed provide 
efficient result, given residential mobility, it is important, it 
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seems to me, to notice that it might well be a biased efficient 
result. To illustrate what I mean by this concept, let us consider 
a divide-the-dollar game between two individuals, as shown in 
Figure 3. In this game, C is not a Pareto-optimal result, and 
F is. However, a move from C to F is not a Pareto-optimal move, 
because John is worse off in F than he is in C. If fat institutional 
reasons the only feasible choices ate C and F, then I would argue 
that Pareto Optimality is not a compelling reason to choose F over 
c. 
[Figure 3 goes here] 
In the fragmentation-consolidation example in the 
earlier section, institutional limitations in the form of a given 
taxation system, given collective decision rules, and given 
limitations on what items are on the agenda, made the move from 
the inefficient consolidated structure to the efficient fragmented 
structure a non-Pareto optimal move� These institutional 
parameters make the choice between fragmentation and consolidation 
a choice of institutional biases, since fragmentation tends to be 
biased in favor of higher-income groups and consolidation in favor 
of lower-income groups. Thus, for policy purposes, it is not 
sufficient to opt for fragmentation because it is an "efficient" 
result while consolidation is not. Any given policy decision may 
provide a choice much like that between C and F in the divide-the­
dollar game. Such a choice is an essentially political choice, 
motivated by redistributional, political, and normative considera­
tions other than efficiency . 
John's 
Share 
$1 
25 
Figure 3 
A Divide-the-Dollar Game 
Pareto Optimal Results 
c 
Joan's Share 
,Pareto Sub-Optimal 
Results 
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If Pareto-optimality is not a sufficient normative 
guideline for a policy decision regarding metropolitan government, 
is "individual choice" any better? It cannot be denied that 
"individual choice", if taken as an intrinsic value, would 
dictate that metropolitan fragmentation is "better" than consoli-
dation. Howeier, I have argued in this paper that the existence 
of choice !hay itself imply a bias in the system. To illustrate-this 
idea further, I would like to identify several different kinds 
of games. Let us imagine a two-person game with a narrow strategy 
choice set for each player, and a dominant strategy equilibrium 
given the narrow choice sets. Now let us imagine that the 
institutional setting of the game changes, and the result is a 
wider range of options for each player, with a new dominant 
strategy equilibrium. This setting is illustrated by the three 
games in Figure 4. In each game, the narrow choice set is just 
one alternative for each player, and the dominant strategy 
equilibrium is the upper left-hand corner box. The-·dominant 
strategy equilibrium with a widened choice set is the lower 
right-hand corner box. 
[Figure 4 goes here] 
The interesting difference among the three games is how 
the new, stronger equilibrium compares with the old. In game I, 
everyone is better off with the wider choice set. In game II, 
everyone is worse off, This game is of course a form of the Prisoners' 
Dilennna. And in game III, one person is better off, and one person 
worse off. 
John 
Narrow 
Choice 
Wider 
Choice 
Narrow 
Choice 
Wider 
Choice 
:Figure 4 
The Ambiguous Value of Choice 
Joan 
Narrow 
0,0 
10, -2 
Wider 
-2 , 10 
8,8 
Joan 
Narrow Wider 
I 
�:' 
-2,10 
I ,-2 0, 0 
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Game I 
Wider Choice Equilibrium 
Unambiguously Better 
Game II 
Prisoner's Dilemma 
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In game I, the players will be able to agree that the 
new institutional setting, with its wider range of choice, is 
unambiguously better. There is a nice coincidence of efficiency 
and widened individual choice . In game II, the Invisible Hand 
is the hand of a malevolent force, guiding the players to an 
inefficient result. The presence of choice is a curse to the 
players. If they can possibly do so, they would like to organize 
to return to the institutional setting that deprives them of 
choice. Thus, in both games I and II, there is no conflict among 
the players over which institutional form is preferred. 
However, in game III, the institutional setting is 
itself a matter of conflict. The allocation of rewards in the 
game is settled by deciding which game is played, so for 
strategic reasons, the conflict over institutional form becomes 
paramount. The institution of a wider choice set has a bias 
towards John, the institution of a narrower choice set has a 
bias towards Joan. 
The essential point of this paper is a very limited 
one. The discussion of metropolitan fragmentation has up to this 
time been largely framed in terms of those who see the presence 
of choice among municipalities as a game I or game II situation. 
The traditional metropolitan reform advocates have suggested that 
the presence of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions is a curse. 
They have suggested that if urban residents could just organize 
themselves into a different, consolidated institutional setting, 
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in which choice of jurisdictional public goods is denied them, 
everyone would be better off, because of improved governmental 
efficiency. The public choice analysts, however, have argued 
that everyone can be better off by widening the choice of 
municipalities, , thus providing everyone the opportunity to move 
to that jurisdiction with a mix of local public goods most suited 
to their tastes, as in game II. 
It is the choice of this paper to suggest that in this 
case the choice of institutions is partisan, conflictual, and 
biased, as in Game III. Certain individuals are helped, others 
hurt by the institution of a wider (or narrower) choice range. 
To argue that a low-income person is not hurt by adding another 
jurisdiction to which he may or may not move is like arguing that 
Joan is not hurt by adding a second strategy alternative in game 
III. Certainly no one is making the low-income individual choose 
any particular municipality, but the widening of the choice set 
makes him worse off no matter which he chooses, because the old 
equilibrium is no longer available to him. Just as John's choice 
of the ·new strategy carries with it an "externality" for John of 
10 units, so the movement of high-income groups to exclusive 
suburbs where they can provide themselves the local public goods 
that suit them, may carry with it an "externality" to th.e low-
income groups that makes the widening of his choices of negative 
value. For practical, political purposes, the existence of 
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individual choice may have negative, instead of positive value, 
and thus must be looked on as an instrumental value, rather than 
being valued in itself. 
While the "Invisible Hand" argument supports fragmentation 
by suggesting a coincidence of individual choice and economic efficiency, 
this paper has sought to demonstrate that the "Invisible Hand" is 
not compelling in this case. An institutional bias imposed by 
such parameters as the local taxation system and the nature of the 
state and local legal systems, makes the organization of metropolitan 
governments an issue that must be addressed and resolved as an 
essentially redistributional and politically conflictual problem . 
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NOTES 
1. Because the purpose of this paper is not primarily to review 
' 
the traditional urban reform position, this position was only 
briefly stated, and no doubt somewhat distorted. For a more 
complete statement of the traditional urban reform position, 
see Haar (1972), Lineberry (1970), and the Committee for 
Economic Development (1966), (1972). 
2. In the area of police services, for instance, see Elinor 
Ostrom and Roger Parks (1973). 
3. This is the cost for a patrol unit, defined as 280 hours of 
patrol a week, with the patrol car, and support services 
including detective work, supervision, overhead, and main-
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